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1. Introduction 
There is a well-established line of research analysing the effects of Bertrand and 
Cournot competition on profit and social welfare. In a seminal paper, Singh and Vives (1984) 
show that choosing quantity (price) contract is the dominant strategy for both firms when the 
goods are substitutes (complements). Furthermore, firms' profits are higher under Cournot 
competition whereas Bertrand competition yields higher social welfare when the input 
markets are competitive1. However, it is often found that input suppliers and the final goods 
producers are involved in two-part tariff vertical pricing contracts (Berto Villa-Boas, 2007 
and Bonnet and Dubois, 2010). Alipranti et al. (2014) show that when a monopoly input 
supplier and two final goods producers determine the two-part tariff vertical pricing contracts 
through a decentralised generalised Nash bargaining process, the equilibrium profits of the 
final goods producers and social welfare are higher under Cournot competition.  
We, on the other hand, aim to revisit the classic question of price and quantity 
contract where the downstream firms involve in centralised bargaining2 with an upstream 
input supplier to determine the two-part tariff vertical pricing contracts. We show that 
choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for the downstream firms and both Bertrand 
and Cournot entail equal welfare level. López and Naylor (2004), López (2007), Mukherjee 
et al. (2012) also consider the implications of Bertrand and Cournot competition in isolation, 
under strategic input-price determination. Their results mostly confirm Singh and Vives' 
(1984) findings and hence, our results are in stark contrast with the existing literature. 
 
2. The model 
We consider an economy with two downstream firms, denoted by Di producing differentiated 
products where       and    . The downstream firms require a critical input for 
production that they purchase from a monopoly input supplier, U, through two-part tariff 
contracts involving an up-front fixed-fee and a per-unit price. U produces the inputs at a 
constant marginal cost of production, c which we assume to be zero. We assume that one unit 
of input is required to produce one unit of the output, and 	 and 
  can convert the inputs to 
the final goods without incurring any further cost.  
 

See Delbono and Denicolò (1990), Qiu (1997) and Häckner (2000) for some works on Bertrand and Cournot 
competition under competitive input markets.

The implications of centralised bargaining is justifiable in most continental European countries, such as 
Germany (Hirsch et al. (2014)). In the context of strategic input-price determination Calmfors and Driffill 
(1998), Danthine and Hunt (1994) argue that collective bargaining is more widely accepted as it internalises 
various negative externalities, such as unemployment. Also, see Flanagan (2003), Boeri and Burda (2009) for a 
critical survey on this strand of literature. 
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We develop a model of three stage game. At stage 1, each downstream firm 
simultaneously chooses whether to adopt quantity contract or price contract. At stage 2, U is 
involved in a centralised bargaining with a representative of 1D  and 2D  to determine the 
terms of the two-part tariff contracts involving an up-front fixed-fee, iF , and a per-unit price, 
iw , 1, 2i = . At stage 3, firms compete contingent to the decisions made in stage 1. We solve 
the game through backward induction. 
Hence, we start our discussion at stage 3. To this extent we consider four possible 
constellations,      ; that attribute to the following properties: 
•    where both firms adopt quantity contracts 
•    where both firms adopt price contracts 
•    where D1 chooses price contract and D2 chooses quantity contract 
•    where D1 chooses quantity contract and D2 chooses price contract. 
We work out the equilibrium outcomes under each of these strategy combinations. 
At stage 2 U, the monopoly input supplier and a representative of 1D  and 2D  
determine the terms of the two-part tariff contract by maximising the following generalised 
Nash bargaining expression 
  	
	  !	"
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 
where 	 and (	 ) !	" denote the output and net profit of the downstream firms and β  
(resp. (1 )β− ) shows the bargaining power of the input supplier (resp. final goods producers). 
We restrict our analysis to + , -.  
Maximising the above with respect to !	 gives the following3 
!	   + 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Substituting (2) in (1), we get the maximisation problem as 
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Eq. (3) shows that the per-unit input price is determined to maximise the industry profit (i.e., 
the total profits of U, 1D  and 2D ), since  
 

Like Aliprant et al. (2014) we also allow negative fixed-fees, which occurs for a small +/  The upstream firm, 
in this case, subsidises downstream's production via fixed-fee.
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which is the profit of a monopoly final goods producer, producing both the products at zero 
marginal cost of production. Hence, it is intuitive that the centralised bargaining entails same 
level of output, consumer surplus and social welfare irrespective of the mode of the contract 
(i.e., Bertrand or Cournot) chosen by the final goods producers.  
Corollary 1: If the final goods producers and a monopoly input supplier involve in 
centralised generalised Nash bargaining to determine the two-part tariff vertical pricing 
contract, the outcomes yield equal level of output, consumer surplus and  social welfare 
irrespective of the type of the product market competition. 
 
 3. Equilibrium outcomes 
We now find out the equilibrium outcomes under a specific (inverse) demand function: 1	 
1 ) 	 ) 3
 , similar to Alipranti et al. (2014) with an exception that we normalise the 
demand intercept to unity for simplicity. 3 ∈ 0,1  measures the degree of product 
differentiation. If 3  1,  the goods are perfect substitutes, and if 3  0,  the goods are 
isolated.  
 
 3.1 (q-q) contract 
Downstream firm's profit motive yields 
Max4 						(	
44 (	44 ) !	 
																																												 1 ) 	 ) 3
 ) 	"	 ) !	 																				4                              
Solving the first order conditions we obtain the equilibrium output of the ith firm 
																																																																										44 
2 ) 3 ) 2	  3

4 ) 3# 																																					5 
Given (5), the profit equation in (4) reduces to 
																																																																						(	44  	# ) !																																																											6 
Maximising (3) subject to (5) and (6) gives the equilibrium per-unit input price and upfront 
fixed fee as 
	44 
1
2 8
3
1  39 
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Given the per-unit input price, the equilibrium fixed-fees gives  
!	44 
+ ) 3  +3
41  3#  
The equilibrium downstream profit is 
																																																																						(	44 
1
4 8
1 ) +
1  39																																																						7 
Next, we work out the consumer surplus and social welfare, are respectively as 
																																										;<44  14 8
1
1  39 						and								<?
44  34 8
1
1  39																													8 
  
3.2 (p-p) contract 
In order to solve the Bertrand game we derive the direct demand function 	  %*A*BCABD%*AE . 
Accordingly, the representative downstream firm maximises the following 
MaxB 						(	
FF (	FF ) !	 
																																																																																								 1	 ) 	 G%*A*BCABD%*AE H ) !	 																	9                                  
The equilibrium price and output of the ith firm can be found as 
1	FF 
1 ) 32  3  2	  3

4 ) 3#  
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	  3

4 ) 3#1 ) 3# 																																				10 
Given the above, downstream's profit maximisation problem in (9) reads as  
																																																		(	FF  1 ) 3#	# ) !																																																												11 
Maximising (3) subject to (9) and (10) gives the equilibrium per-unit input price and fixed 
fees 
	FF 
3
2 				and				!	
FF  14 8
+ ) 3
1  39 
The net equilibrium profits of 1D  and 2D  are 
																																																															(	FF 
1
4 8
1 ) +
1  39																																																												12 
We find the consumer surplus and social welfare as below 
																												;<FF  14 8
1
1  39 													and												<?
FF  34 8
1
1  39																														13 
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3.3 (p-q) contract 
Next consider the situation where % chooses the price contract and # chooses the quantity 
contract. The maximisation problem of the downstream firms yield  
MaxBJ 						(%
F4 (%F4 ) !%																																																							 
																																																												 1% ) %1 ) 1% ) 3# ) !%																																				14. K) 
and, 
Max4E 						(#
F4 (#F4 ) !#																																																								 
																																																											 1 ) # ) 31 ) 1% ) 3# ) ## ) !#															14. L 
Maximising (14.a) and (14.b) determines the equilibrium price charged by %  and the 
corresponding output level of # respectively. 
1%F4 
1 ) 32  3  21 ) 3#%  3#
4 ) 33#  
																																																#F4 
2 ) 3  3% ) 2#
4 ) 33# 																																																										15 
Hence, the profit equations in (14) and (15) reduce to 
																																																					(%F4  %# ) !%																																																																			16. K 
																																																				(#F4  1 ) 3### ) !#																																																			16. L 
We derive the per-unit input price and upfront fixed fees by generalised Nash bargaining  
																																										%F4 
1
2 8
3
1  39 									and									#
F4  32																																									 
and 
!%F4  !#F4 
2+ ) 23  2+3 ) 3#
81  3#  
The net equilibrium profits of 1D  and 2D  are 
(%F4 
2 ) 2+  23 ) 2+3  3#
81  3# 									and						(#
F4  2 ) 2+  23 ) 2+3 ) 3
#
81  3# 							17 
The equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare are respectively 
																																								;<F4  14 8
1
1  39 								and									<?
F4  34 8
1
1  39																									18 
 
3.4 (q-p) contract 
Now consider the case where %  chooses the quantity contract and #  chooses the price 
contract. The maximisation problem of the downstream firms yield  
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4J (%4F  (%4F ) !% 
  ) % ) 3 ) 1# ) 3% ) %% ) !%I/ K) 
and, 
BE (#4F  (#4F ) !# 
 1# ) # ) 1# ) 3% ) !#I/ L 
Maximising (19.a) and (19.b) and solving the first order conditions give the equilibrium price 
and quantity of % and # respectively. 
%4F   ) 3 ) %  3#5 ) .3#  
1#4F   ) 3  3  3%   ) 3##5 ) .3# - 
Hence, the profit equations in (19) give 
(%4F   ) 3#%# ) !%/ K 
(#4F  ## ) !#/ L 
and the following outcomes 
%4F  3 =>#4F   8 3  39 
!%4F  !#4F  + ) 3  +3 ) 3#@  3#  
The net equilibrium profits of 1D  and 2D  are 
(%4F   ) +  3 ) +3 ) 3#@  3# =>(#4F   ) +  3 ) +3  3
#
@  3#  
The equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare are respectively 
;<4F  5 8   39 =><?4F  .5 8   39. 
 
 
4. Results 
We now analyse the first stage of the game where the downstream firms decide whether to 
choose price contract or quantity contract. Table 1 summarises the possible strategies of each 
firm and the realised profit under the respective scenarios.  
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Table 1 
 
 
 
 
The closed form solutions of firms' pay-offs under        are reported in 
equations (7), (12), (17) and (22) respectively. Straightforward calculations give the 
following. 
(%44 ) (%F4  (%4F ) (%FF  (#44 ) (#4F  (#F4 ) (#FF  ) @ 8 3  39
# M - 
The proposition below is immediate from the above.  
Proposition 1: Assume that 3 , - choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for 
both firms. 
The intuition goes as follows. Each final goods producer's profit motive is driven by the 
amount of input price and upfront fixed fee payable to the upstream agent. First, assume that 
firm 2 (firm 1) chooses the quantity contract. When + is significantly high, meaning that the 
input supplier's opportunistic behaviour is more pronounced; firm 1's (firm 2's) output loss 
following an increase in its own input price is larger under quantity contract than under price 
contract. Furthermore, the fixed fee being higher under quantity contract 4 ; !%44 N !%F4 
!#44 N !#4F", firm 1 (firm 2) finds it profitable to choose price contract. Next, if firm 2 (firm 
1) chooses a price contract firm 1 (firm 2) again prefers a price contract over a quantity 
contract as the latter generates a greater loss in its own output level and it involves a higher 
fixed fee; !%4F N !%FF  !#F4 N !#FF". Hence, choosing price contract becomes the dominant 
strategy for both downstream firms. However, when +  is significantly small, the input 
suppliers offer a lump-sum subsidy to the downstream firms (see footnote 3). The 
opportunistic behaviour being less significant, in this case, the downstream firms only combat 
the output reducing effect by choosing price contract (as alluded above). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Allowing a centralised generalised Nash bargaining between the input supplier and the final 
goods producers, we show the social welfare are the same under Bertrand and Cournot 
 

Check that !%44 ) !%F4  !%4F ) !%FF  !#44 ) !#4F  !#F4 ) !#FF  %O G
A
%CAH
# N -	
 Quantity Price 
Quantity 
Price 
(%44  (#44 
(%F4  (#F4 
(%4F (#4F 
(%FF (#FF 
Forthcoming in Economics Letters 




competition. Our result that adopting price contract is the dominant strategy for downstream 
duopoly irrespective of the type of the product attracts renewed interest in the bargaining 
literature.  
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